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Abstract 
 
In this paper we explore the ways in which institutions and networks influence 
entrepreneurial development in Russia. By utilizing new Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) data collected in 2001, we investigate the effects of the weak institutional 
environment in Russia in terms of three dimensions: on the rate of productive entrepreneurial 
activity measured in terms of start-ups and existing business owners; on the characteristics of 
business owners; and on business financing. In addition, the analysis explores the 
effectiveness of Russia’s informal networks for circumventing the weak institutional 
environment for business development. Our results indicate that Russia’s business owners 
share many of the same characteristics as business owners in advanced western countries, 
though education is not associated with entrepreneurial activity. However, the main 
differences are in the sources of financing and the fact that relatively few individuals engage 
in productive entrepreneurial activity. Our results support the notion of the limited 
effectiveness of Russia’s networks for supporting entrepreneurial activity in its weak 
institutional environment. 
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Summary 
 
We explore the influences of the current institutional context in Russia on 
entrepreneurship development. A number of studies have indicated the hostile nature of the 
business environment in Russia though there is surprisingly little empirical evidence. We 
attempt to fill this knowledge gap by specifically testing three hypotheses regarding the 
nature and determinants of entrepreneurship in Russia.  
   Our first hypothesis stipulates that due to the high levels of corruption and weak rule 
of law, firm entry levels will be low. Our second explores the possible influence of human 
capital. We postulate that in the Russian context, human capital as well as skill will be 
positively associated with business entry. Our final hypothesis states that given the 
weaknesses in the Russian capital market, entrepreneurs will disproportionately rely on their 
own firms to finance their start-up activities. 
Our analysis is based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) dataset 
collected in Russia in 2001. A total sample of 2012 adults was interviewed, of which 117 
people responded that they are owner/managers of a new business and have been paying 
salaries for the past 42 months. In terms of start-ups, 105 people responded that they were 
involved in a business start-up i.e. that they had been actively involved in start-up activities 
over the past twelve months.  
To test our first hypothesis, we compare data on business entry rates obtained from 
the Amadeus dataset for a five-year period (1998 to 2002) and the GEM dataset for 2001.  
Russia is found to have a very low level of business entry compared to Western countries. 
This finding provides support for our first hypothesis.  
The results for hypothesis two are surprising since we find that university education is 
not significantly associated with business start-up. Similarly university education is not 
significantly associated with owner/managers of existing firms. However, skill in terms of 
white-collar ‘occupational skills’ is significantly associated with both start-ups and existing 
firm owner/managers.  
In terms of our third hypothesis, our regression results provide strong support for the 
proposition that start-ups in Russia rely very strongly on self-financing. Additional analysis 
of the data also shows that outside financing plays only a minor role as a source of financing 
for Russian business start-ups.  
Our regression results indicate that Russian nascent entrepreneurs as well as business 
owner/managers exhibit many of the same characteristics as their counterparts in advanced 
Western countries. Most notably, they are significantly more likely to be male and younger 
than the population as a whole. An additional and interesting result was the significance of 
entrepreneurial experience as measured in terms of current business ownership on new start-
ups. Though this result can be interpreted in a number of different ways, given the weak 
institutional environment in Russia and hostile business climate, we suggest that this result 
provides an indication of the importance of network relationships for business development 
in weak institutional environments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In this paper, we explore the patterns of entrepreneurial development in Russia; a 
context where many of the preconditions for a workable free-market economy are lacking.  
Our approach builds on Baumol (1993, 2005) in highlighting the impact of economy wide 
incentives and institutional structures on entrepreneurial activity. By using data on 
entrepreneurship in Russia collected as a part of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM), we investigate the ways the Russian context, with its institutional weaknesses and 
history of networks and ‘blat’, influence the characteristics of individuals embarking on 
entrepreneurial activities. This paper therefore supplements the relatively sparse existing 
empirical literature on entrepreneurship development within weak institutional environments 
(Johnson et al. 1999, 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 1999, 2000; Djankov et al. 2005, 2006). 
Baumol (1993) described a variety of historical examples in which innovation was not 
used for productive entrepreneurial ends. His case of medieval China seems the most similar 
to modern day Russia; it did not present suitable incentives for productive entrepreneurship to 
develop and as a consequence, unproductive forms of entrepreneurship flourished. One 
reason for this was the absence of property rights; it was common for the Chinese monarch to 
claim possession of all property in his territories. The enforcement of property rights is also a 
major barrier for business development in Russia, with violations common and the business 
community often opting for informal resolution of conflicts rather than using formal 
institutions (Puffer and McCarthy 2001; Aidis and Adachi 2005) 
2. Baumol also highlights 
the role of corruption as a way of life for civil servants in medieval China, since their official 
salaries were too low to provide an adequate livelihood. Similarly, the pervasiveness of 
corruption in Russia is attributed to the low wages paid to most civil servants. Moreover, 
Russians have become accustomed to a corrupt and a malfunctioning legal environment
3. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a political and economic vacuum that has facilitated 
the emergence of a ‘grabbing hand’ model of government intervention (see Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1999). This is characterized by corrupt behavior occurring in a disorganized way that 
leads to the personal enrichment of government officials to the detriment of the rule of law 
and private business development (Frye and Shleifer, 1997) 
Medieval China was characterized by a negative view towards enterprise. As Baumol 
writes, private enterprise was ‘not only frowned on, but may have been subjected to 
impediments deliberately imposed by the officials’ (1990:902). Similarly, in Russia, 
comparable sentiments exist inherited from the Soviet period when entrepreneurs were 
equated to ‘speculators’ and deemed criminals for making a profit. The Soviet state was built 
on an ideology that stifled independent innovative culture and allowed for a punishment-
oriented ‘inspection culture’ to develop
4. The economy had been run bureaucratically and the 
                                                 
2 However, when the government initiates such disputes as in the Yukos case, even the informal route for 
resolution becomes ineffective.  
3 There is some tradition of this: Even during the Soviet period, the prevailing mentality was one of how to get 
around the laws or enforce them for personal gain rather than a respect and understanding of the law as 
something that protects the rights of its citizens and (private) businesses. As Gelman notes: ‘In the late Soviet 
period, informal ties penetrated all levels of government and served as a survival kit in the everyday life of 
Soviet citizens, Such ties defended ordinary people from the arbitrary state, but they also contributed to a 
vicious circle of cynicism, clientelism and corruption.’(2004:4). 
4 Puffer and McCarthy further note that in Russia the environment has been traditionally hostile towards 
entrepreneurship even in the tsarist era, when modest entrepreneurial activity was conducted primarily by 
minority ethnic groups (2001:29).  
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concentration of reward on plan attainment suppressed the appetite for risk taking and instead 
bred habits of obedience and ‘playing it safe’ (Ellman, 1994).  
Baumol would argue that neither country fulfils the preconditions set forth for the 
existence of a ‘workable free-market economy’ (2005). However, China has apparently been 
able to harness strong economic growth through productive entrepreneurial activity even 
within its inadequate institutional environment (Hsu, 2005) In contrast, it is often argued that 
Russia has not been able to develop high levels of productive entrepreneurship with the 
formal institutional environment being identified as the main barrier to entrepreneurship 
development within its new institutional environment (Djankov and Murrell, 2002), though 
there is surprisingly little empirical evidence. We attempt to fill this gap by specifying and 
testing hypotheses about the nature and determinants of entrepreneurship in Russia, using a 
new household survey focused on Russian entrepreneurship.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section three we present a 
brief literature review and develop our hypotheses. The data used to test our hypotheses are 
discussed in the fourth section and the results are presented in the fifth section. In section six 
we discuss some implications for future research. This paper concludes in section seven. 
 
 
2.  Hypotheses and Controls 
 
 
In this section, we outline some of the most important factors that the literature has 
suggested will influence the extent of entrepreneurship development in Russia as a basis for 
our subsequent empirical work. In Baumol’ s terms, the context for entrepreneurship of a 
growth and welfare-enhancing sort (i.e. productive entrepreneurs) is highly restrictive in 
Russia (Baumol 1990) while the incentive system is conducive to perverse or welfare 
reducing entrepreneurship, as evidenced by the high and rising level of corruption in Russia.  
We commence by considering the influence of institutions and networks. We go on to 
consider factor supply constraints, in particular financial ones, in the Russian context before 
discussing the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs. We derive hypotheses as the 
organizing framework for our empirical work, and discuss control variable suggested by the 
literature. 
A considerable literature argues that weak institutions, notably the quality of the 
commercial code, the strength of legal enforcement, administrative barriers, extra-legal 
payments and lack of market-supporting institutions, represent a significant barrier to 
entrepreneurship (see e.g. McMillan and Woodruff (1999, 2002), Djankov et al (2004)). In a 
study comparing new firms in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, Johnson et al. 
(2000) establish that insecure property rights, in addition to weaknesses of macroeconomic 
stability and adequate financing, inhibit the development of the private sector. This was 
especially clear for Russia and Ukraine. 
These institutions are especially problematic in Russia, where the system is marred 
with inconsistencies and many Soviet regulatory documents are still in force. As a 
consequence it is not always clear which regulations apply in a specific case, creating 
confusion for regulators and the regulated community alike (OECD 2005). In fact, ‘No one 
really knows which laws and regulations are implemented and observed, although it is clear 
that many are not implemented at all, or only partially’ (ibid.). It is not surprising that under 
the current situation, ‘Russian entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals’
5 
                                                 
5 Based on a survey carried out by OPORA in 2001 (A Russian NGO representing small and medium sized 
enterprises). See also OPORA (2005).  
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(Smolchenko 2005). Law enforcement is also rather arbitrary: According to Radaev, over 80 
percent of Russian entrepreneurs have suffered from broken contracts (2002). These factors 
can form further barriers to entry as potential entrepreneurs evaluate the situation and decide 
the business environment is too hostile for entry (Aidis and Adachi 2005).   Furthermore, an 
earlier study by Johnson et al. (1999) indicates that relational contracting, i.e. informally 
enforced through networks, plays a significant role in the transition environment especially in 
cases like Russia where the existing court systems are inadequate.    
These studies highlight the importance of a stable rule of law in terms of enforcement 
of property rights and a functioning court system for private business development.  Based on 
studies compiled by the World Bank, the situation in Russia remains poor in terms of final 
percentile rank though some improvement has taken place (Kauffman, et al. 2005). As shown 
in Table 1, indicators measuring voice and accountability, political stability and regulatory 
quality have all deteriorated since 1998; the percentile rank for government effectiveness, 
rule of law and control of corruption have improved but the rank remains strikingly low. 
 
Table 1: Governance Indicators for Russia in 1998 and 2004 compared 
Governance Indicator 
 
Year  Percentile Rank (0 – 100) 
Voice and Accountability 2004  25.7 
 1998  41.4 
Political Stability  2004  21.8 
 1998  23.6 
Government Effectiveness  2004  48.1 
 1998  23.5 
Regulatory Quality  2004  30.5 
 1998  31.5 
Rule of Law  2004  29.5 
 1998  22.7 
Control of Corruption  2004  29.1 
 1998  25.7 
Source: Kauffman et al. (2005) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkzz2004/sc_chart.asp 
Key: Voice and Accountability measure political, civil and human rights; Political Stability measures the 
likelihood of violent treats to, or changes in, government including terrorism; Government Effectiveness 
measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; Regulatory Quality 
measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies; Rule of Law measures the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; Control of Corruption 
measures the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state 
capture.  
 
 
The level of corruption is also high in Russia. Table 2 reports the results from the 
Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International. We find that, 
compared to most advanced western countries, transition countries generally exhibit higher 
levels of corruption with the highest corruption levels occurring in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Russian entrepreneurs have also been found to be more corrupt 
than the population as a whole, perhaps because they are less able to rely on other networks 
(Djankov et al. 2005). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that corruption is actually on the 
increase in Russia. The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indicates that 
in 2005 more than 39 percent of the respondents in Russia agreed that they have to pay some 
irregular payments or gifts for activities related to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations and 
services frequently. The average percentage of corruption was under 21 percent and 
decreasing for transition countries as a whole. 
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Table 2: Corruption Perceptions index 2004 (out of 145) 
CEEB Countries  Rank  CIS Countries  Rank 
Bulgaria 54  Armenia  82 
Czech R.  51  Azerbaijan  140 
Estonia 31  Belarus  74 
Hungary 42  Georgia  133 
Latvia 57  Kazakhstan  122 
Lithuania 44  Kyrgyzstan  122 
Poland 67  Moldova 114 
Romania 87  Russia  90 
Slovak R.  57  Tajikistan  133 
Slovenia 31  Turkmenistan  133 
  Ukraine  122 
  Uzbekistan  114 
Key: Lower scores indicate lower levels of corruption. 
Compared with Finland which ranks number 1; the UK which ranks 11
th and Japan which ranks 24
th. 
Source: Transparency International (2005) 
 
 
 
Our analysis of the evolving institutional context in Russia leads us to hypothesize 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Levels of entrepreneurial activity will be lower in Russia than in economies 
with better-developed market supporting institutions.  
 
Human capital is an important aspect of successful entrepreneurship, though the 
empirical findings for developed economies about the impact of human capital measured in 
terms of education on entrepreneurship are mixed. Thus, Robinson and Sexton (1994) and 
Cooper and Dunkelberg (1987) find that the decision to become self-employed is influenced 
by education while the results of Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Honig 
(2003) show a clear education effect for nascent entrepreneurs.  However in a cross-country 
study, Uhlaner and Thurik (2005) find that a higher level of education is accompanied by 
lower rates of self-employment. Some country variations have also been noted. De Wit and 
van Winden (1989) and Blanchflower (2004) find that education is positively correlated with 
self-employment in the US but is negatively correlated in Europe. More recent evidence 
compiled by Parker (2005) suggests that on average, entrepreneurs tend to be more educated 
than non- entrepreneurs.  
The transition countries including Russia fare relatively well in terms of formal 
measures of education. Literacy rates are high and educational standards are comparable to 
Western Europe (see Estrin et al., 2006). Also, Russia has a high proportion of students in 
‘hard’ subjects - science, mathematics and engineering (see World Bank, 2005). Indeed the 
high levels of education are one of the main characteristics distinguishing Russia from most 
other emerging markets, which it resembles more closely in terms of institutional 
development. One might therefore expect that the relatively high proportion of educated 
people in the population, and especially those with advanced levels of technological training, 
would offset to some extent the unpromising institutional environment. There is some 
evidence already for this view: Barberis et al (1996), find that human capital was an 
important ingredient for successful new entry by small firms in Russia. Hence, we 
hypothesize:    
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 Hypothesis 2: In Russia, the probability that an individual becomes an entrepreneur will be 
positively affected by their level of education and skill. 
 
Financing and capital constraints are also a major issue for potential entrepreneurs. 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that, due to capital constraints, there is a positive 
relationship between the probability of becoming self-employed and the assets of the 
entrepreneur. Using US data, Hurt and Lusardi (2004) identify a non-linear relationship 
between household wealth and the propensity to start a business, with a positive relationship 
found only for the households in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution. Furthermore 
Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) report a negative effect of the perception of lack of finance on the 
probability of being self-employed, using European data for 2000, though Grilo and Thurik 
(2005) are unable to identify an effect for 2004. A number of studies have also established 
that lack of finance is a barrier for businesses in transition economies (Pissarides 1999, 2004; 
Pissarides et al. 2000; Kaganova 2002; Aidis 2003; Aidis and Sauka 2005;  EBRD 2002, 
2005) as well as specifically in Russia (Puffer and McCarthy 2001). Klapper et al. (2002) 
analyzed firm financing in 15 transition countries. Most were found to exhibit a relatively 
low level of outside financing. Firms in 6 of the 15 countries (including Russia) had total 
liability ratios of less than one (firms borrow less than $1 for every $2 invested in equity) 
which is low compared to the median leverage ratio of $1.73 for Western European firms. 
There was also almost no use of long-term debt that could indicate an underdeveloped 
banking sector, as well as poor collateral law and weak collateral registries. However, a 
significant and positive relationship was found between a business environment that 
promotes access to financing and the size of the SME sector.  
          Financial barriers may therefore constitute a barrier for both start-ups and business 
expansion in the Russian context. Ten years ago, it was possible to start-up a business with 
very little capital and most entrepreneurs could rely solely on their personal savings. 
However, the costs have increased because of competition and the need to enter at a higher 
level of sophistication (Aidis and Adachi 2005). Russian start-ups have been estimated to 
need at least $10 000 – 20 000 while per capita GDP in Russia in 2004 was $ 9 800
6.  
External sources for start-up capital have been found to be rare,
7 and most bank funding is 
only available for short-term loans with high interest rates
8. This places relatively greater 
significance to personally generated funds, and suggests that entrepreneurs will be from 
households with higher incomes.
9 
 
Hypothesis 3: Weaknesses in the Russian capital market will lead entrepreneurs to rely 
disproportionately on their own funds to finance their new firm ventures.  
 
                                                 
6 According to the CIA World Factbook  (http://www.cia.gov). 
7 According to a survey carried out by OPORA (A Russian NGO representing small and medium sized 
enterprises) only 15.9 percent of small businesses across Russia make use of bank loans (OPORA 2005; 
Smolchenko 2005). 
8  In the OPORA survey, among the reasons cited for failure to obtain a loan, more than 47 percent of the 
business owner respondents stated high interest rates as the main reason (OPORA 2005). 
9 Capital scarcity poses a problem not only for the establishment of businesses but also for their growth. Case 
studies suggest that engagement in trade often serves as initial capital accumulation that allows entrepreneur to 
branch off into a different business (Smallbone and Welter 2001). Portfolio entrepreneurship is another way for 
businesses to hedge against volatility of markets in transition. Smallbone and Welter (2001) find that 
entrepreneurs engaged in manufacturing and construction are more likely to have several enterprises then those 
operating in the services sector.  They explain this phenomenon by higher volatility and unpredictability of the 
manufacturing and construction sectors, particularly in regard to financial flows.  
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While the institutional context may differ considerably, there seems no reason to 
hypothesize that most of the characteristics favoring entrepreneurial activity in other 
economies would be systematically different in the Russian context. We therefore control in 
our regression analysis for many of these, subject to the limitations of the dataset in providing 
suitable proxies.  
Firstly, the literature notes the importance of individual factor supply characteristics.  
According to Reynolds et al. (2002) men are about twice as likely to be involved in 
entrepreneurial activities as women. Indeed, most research indicates that men have a higher 
probability of becoming entrepreneurs than women (Minniti et al. 2005; Verheul et al. 2006). 
Moreover, the likelihood of becoming self-employed varies with age. Relatively more 
business owners are in the 25 – 45 year old age category (Storey 1994; Reynolds et al. 1999) 
and relatively more nascent business owners are even younger, between 25 – 34 years of age 
(Delmar and Davidsson 2000).
10 We control for skill, age and gender in the regressions. 
The literature has also analyzed the motives and personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs. The critical distinction in terms of motivation is between needs-based and 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. The former induces people to set up a business to earn 
their living because alternative income sources (employment or social welfare) are scarce. 
Opportunity driven entrepreneurs follow more intrinsic motives such as to be independent, to 
implement an idea, a technology, or to make a contribution to society, and are more typical 
for developed countries. Smallbone and Welter (2001) observe a large proportion of start-ups 
in transition economies being needs based. We control for opportunity-based motivation in 
our empirical work.                                                                                                                                               
According to the GEM 2005 Executive Report, the ratio of opportunity-driven to 
necessity-driven business owners is higher in high income countries than in middle income 
countries, though middle income countries tend to exhibit higher percentages of individuals 
starting businesses
11. In terms of classification, Western European countries are included in 
the high income countries, while transition countries (such as Hungary and Latvia) as well as 
emerging economies such as Brazil and China are considered middle income countries. 
Though not included in the GEM study, Russia would be considered a middle income 
country. In terms of education, the GEM study finds that individuals with post-secondary 
education or graduate school experience are more involved in early-stage entrepreneurial 
activity or as established business owners in middle income countries than in high income 
countries. In general, individuals who are involved in any stage, regardless of country, tend to 
be more confident in their own skills and are less likely to let fear of failure prevent them 
from starting a new venture (GEM 2005).  
The personal characteristics of entrepreneurs have been found to vary greatly across 
transition economies. According to Szelenyi (1988) entrepreneurs under socialism often came 
from families with previous entrepreneurial traditions, a phenomenon also identified by 
Webster (1992). Smallbone and Welter (2001) argue that family tradition was of particular 
importance in countries like Poland, which permitted the continuation of small-scale private 
activities throughout the communist era though of course, Russia lacked this tradition (Puffer 
                                                 
10 The demographic structure of Russia, with a relatively low proportion of young people, may therefore be an 
additional obstacle to entrepreneurship. 
11 The 2005 GEM report is based on the results of  35 participating countries. According to their classification of 
participating countries the following are considered high income countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US. The following countries were considered 
middle income countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Croatia, Hungary, Jamaica, Latvia, Mexico, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela (GEM 2005).  
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and McCarthy 2001)
12. How do these entrepreneurs build their businesses in view of high 
uncertainty and a not very supportive institutional environment? Generally, they adopt 
strategies that allow them to circumvent burdensome institutions or create substitutes for 
missing ones. As McMillan and Woodruff (2002) argue, entrepreneurs in transition 
economies ‘succeeded by self-help: they built for themselves substitutes for the missing 
institutions. Reputational incentives substituted for court enforcement of contracts. Trade 
credit (loans from firm to firm along the supply chain) substituted for bank credit. 
Reinvestment of profits substituted for outside equity’. Strategies documented in the literature 
include engagement in trade and diversification of activities as a means of capital 
accumulation and hedging against risks (Smallbone and Welter 2001) and using network-
based transactions to substitute for missing or costly markets (Stark 1996; Batjargal 2003). 
The hostile conditions under which entrepreneurs operate suggests that business owners will 
also exhibit skepticism towards the national government in terms of their ability and/or 
willingness to support (or simply not interfere with) private business development, though 
they may have great confidence in their own abilities. We control for entrepreneurial 
confidence in our regressions.  
Informal institutions based on networks can also positively affect entrepreneurial 
development. In the absence of functioning institutions, informal structures such as networks 
gain in importance and significance. As Smallbone and Welter (2001) have shown, informal 
networks can play a very important role for entrepreneurs in assisting them to mobilize 
resources and cope with the constraints of highly bureaucratic structures and officials that 
characterize the situation in countries such as Russia. However, not all networks are the 
same. Even in advanced Western countries where institutions are functioning, both strong and 
weak network ties have been found to be important in different ways (Granovetter 1973, 
1995). Strong ties are characterized by frequent contact, high emotional intensity and 
intimacy, and reciprocal commitments between the parties involved. Weak ties are 
characterized by more superficial contact and are based on a relationship of trust. We return 
to this issue in the conclusions. 
 
 
3.  Data 
 
 
This paper is based on data collected in Russia in 2001. A total sample of 2012 
adults
13 was interviewed (face to face) in July in 2001 by the firm ‘Memrb’
14 which was 
selected by the GEM
15  national team in Russia to conduct the survey. Additional 
specifications used for the Russia sample included quotas to balance results in terms of 
gender and municipalities. As shown in Table 3, because of the enormous diversity across 
regions in Russia, the sample was geographically focused and stratified. 
                                                 
12 Roberts and Zhou (2000) find that former Soviet countries saw different entrepreneurial strategies than 
advanced reformers such as Hungary.  First, the former are more likely to start in trading and then diversify. 
Thus a ‘generic businessman, always trading, maybe opening a restaurant one year, a taxi business the next, then 
maybe buying a meat-processing plant…’ (ibid: 194). Second, entrepreneurs in former Soviet countries are 
more likely to pursue entrepreneurial careers as a part-time occupation while being employed elsewhere. 
Finally, while Central European firms mostly operate in the official economy, Russian entrepreneurs conduct a 
significant proportion of their business in the second economy. 
13 The adult population was defined as individuals over 18 years of age. 
14 Membr has since then become a part of the firm Synovate. 
15 The standard procedures for GEM surveys were followed. See http://www.gemconsortium.org for further 
description.  
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Table 3: Geographical stratification of the sample 
City Number  of  respondents  Percentage 
Moscow 202  10.04 
St. Petersburg  200    9.94 
Chelyabinsk 200      9.94 
Krasnodar 200      9.94 
Novosibirsk 201      9.99 
Omsk 204  10.14 
Tver 200      9.94 
Volgograd 203  10.09 
Ekaterinburg 200      9.94 
Samara 202  10.04 
Total 2012 100 
 
 
 
In Table 4, we report the mean values and standard deviations for all the main 
independent variables employed in our empirical work. The dataset contains 2012 
observations, and there are a number of possible definitions of entrepreneurial activity. The 
most general is when the respondent describes himself or herself as trying to start a new 
business, and this classification contains 129 respondents. However, of these, 24 have not 
been active in the proposed new business in the past twelve months and only 61 respondents 
are claiming to have actually started a new business.
16 Entrepreneurial activity can also be 
measured in terms of the total number of business owner-managers.  In the Russia sample, 
117 people responded that they are owners/managers of a new business and have been paying 
salaries for the past 42 months. In our empirical work, we focus on the differences in 
characteristics between the entire sample and two measures of entrepreneurial activity: 
individuals engaged actively in start-up and respondents who are currently business owner-
managers.  
   As Table 4 indicates, the sample was balanced in terms of gender with an almost 
equal number of male and female respondents.  However, higher percentages of male 
respondents were engaged in entrepreneurial activity than female respondents. Of those 
individuals involved in start-up activities, more than 38 percent were motivated by the desire 
to ‘exploit business opportunities’.  A much higher percentage of business owners (59 
percent) were motivated by the desire to ‘exploit business opportunities’.  In terms of 
financing, more than 30 percent of those individuals involved in start-up activities were self-
financed.  
Close to 40 percent of the total sample were ‘young’, aged 18 to 34 years. More than 
half of the individuals involved in start-up activities were ‘young’ individuals and 
approximately 45 percent were business owners. In terms of education, less than 14 percent 
of the total sample had completed university education while more than 20 percent of the 
individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities were highly educated.  
Moreover, the average monthly household income levels were found to be lower for 
the sample as a whole than for individuals engaged in business start-ups or for business 
owners. The average monthly income for individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities 
                                                 
16 The start-up definition used here is where the respondent agreed that over the past twelve months they have 
engaged in activities to start a new business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up 
team, working on a business plan, beginning to save money, or any other activity that would help launch a 
business. 
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was in the range of $ 137 – 169 while for the total sample, it was approximately $ 103 – 136. 
Lower levels of blue-collar workers were engaged in entrepreneurial activity either in start-
ups (13 percent) or as business owners (10 percent) than were found in the sample as a whole 
(25 percent).  
The survey also collected information about the respondent’s optimism with regards 
to improvements to their family’s financial situation in the next 12 months as well as 
improvements to Russia’s financial situation in the next 12 months. In both cases, 
entrepreneurial individuals (those engaged in start-up activities or business owners) were 
more optimistic than the sample as a whole especially in terms of their family’s financial 
situation. 
Since the sample was geographically stratified it is interesting to note that there was a 
higher proportion of entrepreneurial activity taking place in Moscow (in terms of start-ups 
and business owners) and in Ekaterinburg (in terms of start-ups) than in the other eight 
regions. 
In terms of size, close to three fourths of the existing business owners were micro-
firms employing less than 10 employees and over 50 percent of which had less than four 
employees, though less than 10 percent of the business owners were effectively self-
employed i.e. had no employees at all.   
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Table 4: General characteristics of the total sample and individuals engaged in 
entrepreneurial activity: start-ups and business owners 
Entrepreneurial 
Activity 
 
Total 
Sample  
N= 2012 
Start-ups 
 
N= 105 
Business 
Owners 
N= 117 
Characteristics    Description 
Mean 
SD 
Mean 
SD 
Mean 
SD 
Male  
 
1 = Male, zero otherwise.  0.498 
(0.500) 
 
0.686 
(0.466) 
0.498 
(0.500) 
Business owner  
 
  1 = Respondent currently 
owns/manages a business, zero 
otherwise. 
 
0.058 
(0.234) 
0.495 
(0.502) 
 
Opportunity –  
Motivation 
start-up 
 
1 = Exploit new business opportunity as 
reason to start-up a new business, zero 
otherwise. 
 
0.024 
(0.152) 
0.381 
(0.488) 
 
Opportunity –   
Motivation 
existing business 
  
 1 = Exploit business opportunity as the 
reason for the existing business. 
 
0.388 
(0.193) 
 0.388 
(0.193) 
 
Self-financed  
 
1 = Start-up is self-financed, zero 
otherwise. 
0.017 
(0.131) 
0.324 
(0.470) 
 0.017 
(0.130) 
 
Young age  
 
1 = Respondent aged 18 – 34 yrs., zero 
otherwise. 
0.393 
(0.488) 
0.533 
(0.501) 
 0.649 
(0.475) 
 
University  edu.  1 = Respondent completed university 
education, zero otherwise. 
 
0.136 
(0.342) 
0.209 
(0.409) 
0.136 
(0.342) 
 
HH income*  Categorical variable: Monthly household 
income (in roubles): 
1 = < 2 000 RUB          ( < $ 68 ) 
2 = 2 001 – 3 000 RUB ( $ 69 – 102 ) 
3 = 3 001 – 4 000 RUB ( $ 103 – 136)  
4 = 4 001 – 5 000 RUB ( $ 137 – 169) 
5 = 5 001 – 6 000 RUB ( $ 170 – 203) 
6 = 6 001 – 7 000 RUB ( $ 204 – 237) 
7 = 7 001 – 8 000 RUB ( $ 238 – 271) 
8 = > 8 000 RUB           ( > $ 272) 
 
3.056 
(1.972) 
4.495 
(2.583) 
4.056 
(1.972) 
 
Blue collar 
worker 
 
  1 = Unskilled or skilled worker, zero 
otherwise. 
0.247 
(0.431) 
0.133 
(0.342) 
0.247 
(0.431) 
Family optimism  
 
  1 = Family financial situation will 
improve in the next 12 months, zero 
otherwise. 
 
0.32 
(0.467) 
0.609 
(0.490) 
0.321 
(0.467) 
Country  optimism  1 = Country financial situation will 
improve in the next 12 months, zero 
otherwise. 
 
0.292 
(0.455) 
0.352 
(0.480) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
Moscow  
 
1 = Respondent lives in Moscow, zero 
otherwise. 
 
0.100 
(0.300) 
0.180 
(0.387) 
0.100 
(0.300)  
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Ekaterinburg  
 
1 = Respondent lives in Ekaterinburg, 
zero otherwise. 
 
0.099 
(0.299) 
0.162 
(0.370) 
0.099 
(0.299) 
Employees  
 
Continuous variable indicating the 
number of employees. 
 
  26.180 
(103.32) 
Standard deviation is given in parenthesis. * = lower response levels were obtained for hhincome: total sample 
(N = 1787 ) Start-ups (N = 91) Business Owners (N= 101). 
 
 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
 
In this section, we test the three hypotheses developed from the second section. We 
first address Hypothesis 1, using information about the rate of formation of new firms in 
Russia and levels of entrepreneurial activity. We are unable to test this hypothesis directly 
with our dataset, because there it is a cross section sample and as such there is no variation in 
the institutional environment. However, we assemble data to suggest that entrepreneurship 
rates are low in Russia, which, given the information about the institutional environment in 
section 3, is consistent with our hypothesis. We test the remaining hypotheses directly using 
probit regressions to explore the differences in characteristics between individuals 
undertaking various forms of entrepreneurial activity.  
 
4.1 Rates of Entrepreneurship in Russia  
 
In Table 5, we report data on entry of new firms and entrepreneurial activity in Russia 
1998-2002. After a catastrophic period of macro-economic performance immediately 
subsequent to transition from communism, the Russian economy had begun to recover during 
the mid-1990s, only to suffer a major slump following the financial crisis in 1998 (EBRD, 
2002). However, the devaluation at that time, and subsequent increases in the price of oil and 
other raw materials inaugurated a long period of relatively fast growth in Russia, from 1999, 
which has been maintained until this day.  The macro-economic environment was therefore 
relatively benign for new firm creation during most of this period, including in 2001, which 
was the date of the GEM survey. 
The upper part of the table uses data from the Amadeus dataset (see also Klapper et 
al.  2004). This dataset is largely restricted to firms with more than 50 employees, and 
therefore focuses on entry into the middle size firm category, rather than the creation of small 
firms. However, the dataset has the advantage that it contains the year of registration of firms, 
and hence provides a record of the formal entry rate into this size class and above. The 
second part of the table provides information from the GEM dataset in terms of different 
types of self-reported entrepreneurial activity. 
Interestingly, both datasets tell a very similar story. According to Amadeus, entry 
rates in Russia during this period of relatively fast growth were extremely low by 
international standards. The literature suggests that entry rates in Western Europe and North 
America are more typically in the 5-15 percent range, and for developing and some transition 
economies possibly somewhat higher (see Cable and Schwalbach, 1991; Klapper et al., 
2004). The Amadeus data indicate that entry rates in Russia are consistently amongst the 
lowest recorded internationally. Though the GEM sample suggests that a slightly higher 
proportion of individuals in Russia are interested in trying to create a firm (though the levels  
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remain low by international standards), the number of people actually creating an active firm 
represents only 2.2 percent of the sample. This is somewhat higher than indicated by the 
Amadeus dataset, but of course contains all firms of any size, rather than only middle sized 
and large ones. Taken together, the figures in Table 5 provide a priori evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, though additional data would be required for a formal test of relationship 
between institutions and entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Table 5: Entry Rates of New Firms in Russia  
 
 
 
 
4.2 Testing the remaining hypotheses 
 
We test the remaining hypotheses by exploring the differences in characteristics 
between the individuals involved in either active start-ups or having created new firms and 
those of the population as a whole. We estimate equations of the form: 
        
  The probability of being an entrepreneur/business owner =f (Personal characteristics, 
Financial characteristics, Personal attitudes, Russia context variables). 
 
Since the dependent variable is probabilistic, we use probit estimation methods. The 
dataset contains a large number of variables concerning personal characteristics, many of 
them already used in the literature discussed in section 3. We therefore use indicators of 
Amadeus Dataset  
1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 
Entry rate % (new registrations as % firm numbers)  2.0 1.1 0.8 0.6  0.8 
No. Of firms in sample  5226 972  8442 18,374 10,407 
GEM Dataset: Alternative measures of Entrepreneurship 
  2001 (% sample) 
Start-up  - respondents trying to start new business  5.57 
Start-up  - active in past year  5.2 
Nascent firm – active in starting business but not yet paying wages  3.0 
New firm – owner/manager of new firm paying wages for three months  2.2  
  14
gender, age, human capital including educational attainment (university level), skill 
experience (blue-collar vs. white-collar work experience) and previous entrepreneurial 
experience (for active start-ups).   
 
The Russian business environment relies disproportionately on networks and informal 
contacts, and this is likely to affect entrepreneurial activity particularly through the sources of 
funding for setting up new firms. In Figure 1, we report the distribution of expected sources 
of finance for new start-ups in Russia. Respondents are allowed to complete more than one 
category. The figures suggest that external sources of funding play little or no role in 
entrepreneurship in Russia. Less than 15 percent of start-ups foresee using banks and less 
than 10 percent expect any access to government support. Instead, the majority of 
respondents expect to rely on their own funds, while the prevalence of networks is indicated 
by the high proportion of ‘work contacts’ and ‘friends’ who are viewed as sources of 
financial capital. 
 
Figure 1: Sources of funding  
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                 Note: Since respondents could give more than one answer, percentages add up to over 100 percent.   
 
 
In the regressions, we control for financial constraints in Hypothesis 3 by including a 
dummy variable for those who rely on their own funds to support their entrepreneurial 
activity. We would expect individuals who intend to rely more on their own funds to be better 
off (there is a small positive correlation with household income) and perhaps also more 
highly motivated to succeed, and therefore predict a positive relationship with entrepreneurial 
activity. We also control for household income directly, with the expectation of a positive 
effect. In Figure 2 the distribution of monthly incomes in Russia (from our sample) is shown. 
The absolute values are surprisingly low and the majority of households in our sample earned 
less in each month than $170 per capita, which would suggest that the capital available from 
own resources to finance entrepreneurial activity was very limited. 
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Figure 2: Monthly Household income for startups (Percentage of respondents) 
 
Note: GDP per capita in Russia in 2001: $ 2 123 USD (EBRD 2005) 
 
 
Our data set also contains information about the attitudes of the respondents to their 
own situation, and to Russia’s future. We use these to include in the regressions two 
indicators of ‘optimism’, one related to the respondent’s view of his or her own situation 
(‘financial situation will improve in the next twelve months’) and the other to the business 
environment (‘Russia’s financial situation will improve in the next twelve months’).  
Finally, the regressions contain several variables of specific interest in the Russian 
context. One concerns the motivation of the respondent in creating a new firm. To explore  
whether willingness to undertake entrepreneurial activity is affected by motivation, we 
distinguish between individuals seeking to exploit a business opportunity, and those 
undertaking entrepreneurial activity out of need. It has also been noted that entrepreneurs in 
Russia often already have entrepreneurial experience, which may be of particular significance 
in the Russian business environment because of the need for networks. However, these 
variables must be omitted from the business owner regressions because experience and 
current ownership are highly collinear. Finally Russia is very diverse regionally and though 
the sampling procedure concentrated on a few oblasts only, we control further for regional 
heterogeneity by including regional dummy variables. (In practice only the controls two big 
cities - Moscow and Ekaterinburg - were ever statistically significant).  
The two dependent variables measure different aspects of entrepreneurial activity in 
terms of start-ups, business-owners and expected job growth. These variables are described in 
table 6.  
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Table 6: Dependent variables measuring entrepreneurial activity 
 
Variables   Description  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
N 
Start-up   1 = the respondent has been active in starting a new 
business in the past year, zero otherwise. 
 
0.052 0.222  2012 
Business Owner  1 = the respondent is currently an owner/manager of a 
business, zero otherwise. 
 
0.058 0.234  2012 
 
 
  In this dataset, there were no means by which to control for the possible endogeneity 
of household income and income from entrepreneurial activities, therefore, we ran additional 
estimations omitting household income and this did not effect the significance of our main 
results. In addition, we re-estimated our two equations omitting the variables for location 
(dummy variable for Moscow and Ekaterinburg). Here only one effect is noted: the control 
variable measuring  personal optimism became slightly significant.  
 
4.3 Regression Results 
 
The findings of our probit regressions, for ‘active start-ups’ and ‘created new firms’, 
are reported in Table 7. Because of missing values, the regressions use 1787 observations
17, 
and are highly significant with the chi-square indicating significance of the equations at the 
99 percent level and the pseudo R Square for the active start-up equation exceeding 56 
percent (the fit is not so high for the new firm equation, but as we see from Table 4, there are 
fewer respondents in this category and the fit is still reasonable for cross section regressions). 
Both regressions confirm important elements of our of Hypothesis 2. Our estimations 
show that individuals who are engaged in active start-ups as well as those who have created a 
new firm are significantly associated with white-collar occupations. However, perhaps 
surprisingly given the relatively high levels of education in Russia and the strong scientific 
educational base, university education does not significantly influence the probability of an 
individual becoming an entrepreneur. This may reflect the character of Russian higher 
education, being focused to science rather than entrepreneurship or management, or that the 
opportunities for entrepreneurship in these early years of transition have not been in areas 
where individuals can exploit their knowledge and skills
18.  
Table 7 also confirms the predicted role (hypothesis 3) of financial constraints. We 
find that, after controlling for labor supply factors, individuals who have higher household 
income are more likely to wish to be, and to become, entrepreneurs.   
In terms of the control variables, our results indicate that similarly to Western 
countries, respondents engaged in active start-ups and in running new firms are significantly 
more likely to be male and young (though people considering entrepreneurial activity are 
                                                 
17 The missing variables are attributed to lack for responses for the variable measuring household income. When 
we omit this variable from the estimation model, we obtain 2012 observations. However the signs and statistical 
significance of the remaining variables are not affected by the omission and changing sample size. 
18 Different types of entrepreneurship emerge due to different levels of market demand as transition progresses. 
In the earlier stages of transition, replicative entrepreneurship such as trade and basic services based on imitating 
business activities already in existence in other countries tends to be pervasive. However in later transition 
stages, innovative entrepreneurship (such as knowledge based entrepreneurial activities in high tech sectors) 
gains importance due to increased market opportunities based on changing patterns of market demand (Aidis 
2005), providing more opportunities for highly educated individuals to apply their knowledge and skills to 
entrepreneurial activity as a result.    
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younger than those undertaking it already), Respondents engaged actively in start-up activity 
are not different to the remainder of the population with respect to personal optimism, or 
attitudes towards the Russian business environment. However, for respondents who have 
actually managed to create a new firm, we identify a positive impact from personal optimism. 
These results are in line with the findings of Puffer and McCarthy (2001) in Russia and the 
preliminary findings of Djankov et al. 2006 as well as the general findings of the relationship 
between optimism and the propensity to become an entrepreneur (Parker 2006).  However, a 
positive attitude to the future of Russia as a whole is still not significantly associated with 
entrepreneurial activity. This suggests that in the adverse Russian environment, personal 
optimism plays a positive role in converting aspirations to reality for entrepreneurs. However, 
entrepreneurs do not have any systematically different perception about the future business 
prospects of Russia to the rest of the population.  
We find the expected positive and significant impacts in the start-up equation from 
the entrepreneurial experience variable (currently owner of business) and from opportunity 
rather than needs motivation. The former may be an additional indicator of the role of 
networks and informal contacts in the Russian context. Finally, the regional dummy variables 
are significant in the start-up equation, but not in the new firm one, suggesting that local 
conditions may be influential in persuading individuals to consider becoming an 
entrepreneur, but are not in actual decision to create a new firm. 
 
Table 7: Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Russia (Probit)  
Independent Variables  ‘Active Start-up’  ‘Created New Firm’ 
Male  0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
Currently owner of business (experience)  1.70*** 
(0.18)  - 
Exploiting new business opportunity  1.72*** 
(0.31)  - 
Self-financed  3.18*** 
(0.62) 
0.90*** 
(0.261) 
Young (18 - 44)
a 
           (18 – 34)
b 
b0.44*** 
(0.16) 
a 0.48*** 
(0.14) 
University educated  0.02 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
Household income  0.09*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
Blue collar  -0.50** 
(0.24) 
-0.71*** 
(0.17) 
Personally optimistic  0.11 
(0.17) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
Optimistic about Russia  0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
Moscow  0.39* 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
Ekaterinberg  0.60*** 
(0.21) 
-0.17 
(0.21) 
N 1787  1787 
Pseudo R
2  0.5600 0.1845 
Chi
2  402.76 134.84 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.  
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5. Implications and Future Directions: The importance of weak networks in weak 
institutional environments 
 
 
In the literature based on advanced western countries, networks assist entrepreneurs in 
accessing the resources needed for business formation (Aldrich et al 1987). Johannisson even 
postulates that the ‘birth of a new venture’ is the ‘institutionalization of a part of the 
entrepreneur’s personal network into a venture’ (2000:37). Networks have been found not 
only to be important for access to resources (such as information, finance and labor) but also 
networks have been found to greatly enhance the entrepreneur’s opportunity recognition 
capabilities (Hills et al 1997). Ardichvili et al (2003) identify social networks as an 
antecedent for entrepreneurial alertness which constitutes a necessary condition for 
opportunity recognition. Some scholars have argued that a cohesive or densely embedded 
network provides a competitive advantage for entrepreneurs (Coleman 1988, 1990; Walker et 
al 1997; Ahuja 2000). While other scholars have identified that sparsely connected networks 
full of ‘structural holes’ provide the competitive advantage (Burt 1992). For example, Singh 
et al (1999) have found that the size and number of weak ties in an entrepreneur’s social 
network were positively related to the number of new venture ideas and opportunities 
recognized. Moreover, network entrepreneurs were found to identify significantly more 
opportunities than solo entrepreneurs.  
In the Russian context people have had, as a matter of survival, to develop networked 
strategies, in form of ‘blat’, as a way to obtain scarce resources within the malfunctioning 
Soviet regime. In more recent years, however, blat has not been able to evolve into a 
substitute for the weak and malfunctioning institutional environment. To the contrary, blat 
has devolved into a sophisticated form of corruption available only to the elite (Hsu 2005). 
The reason for blat’s shift from providing access to scarce resources for the masses (under 
Soviet rule) to becoming a tool effective only for the elite (in the Russian Federation) is 
attributed to two main factors. Firstly, blat was never rooted in a moral system: even during 
the Soviet regime, it was seen as ‘antisocial’ and as a way of ‘cheating the system’, thus 
carrying amoral connotations (Ledeneva 1998). This resulted in ‘blat’ being easily 
manipulated towards opportunistic activities focused exclusively on personal gain (Hsu 
2005). Secondly, since blat functions best in the Russian context by utilizing strong ties, 
those individuals closest to individuals with power i.e. the elite, are arguably able to benefit 
much more greatly than less well-connected individuals. Thus blat networks functioning in 
the new Russian free-market context have supported personal and group benefits based on 
strong ties with disproportionate gain for elite groups.  This has serious implications for 
entrepreneurship development in Russia since they suggest that given the current strong-tie 
based network system, only the individuals in the inner circle of the elite can successfully 
utilize ‘blat’ resources for business formation. 
Studies in Russia have found evidence to support the importance of networks for 
business performance. To test the importance of social capital, Batjargal (2003) uses a social 
embeddedness approach to examine the impact of entrepreneurs’ social capital on their firm’s 
performance in Russia. Based on interviews conducted in 1995 and 1999, he finds that 
relational embeddedness (the quality of personal relations on economic actions) and resource 
embeddedness (networks allowing access and use of resources) have direct positive impacts 
on firm performance whereas structural embeddedness (the structure of the overall network 
of relations) has no direct impacts on performance (as measured by revenue and profit 
margin). Similarly, case study material provides further support for the notion in Russia that 
having the right network connections facilitates business success (Kets de Vries and Florent-
Treacy 2003) whereas not having access to networks may make private businesses more  
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vulnerable to rent-seeking officials (Glasser, 2004; Djankov et al., 2006) find additional 
evidence  in their large-scale comparative study of entrepreneurs in Russia and China, which  
indicates that social networks (combined with individual characteristics) play a fundamental 
role in explaining entrepreneurship in both contexts. They have identified for example that 
having a father in Russia who was a communist party member increases the likelihood to 
become an entrepreneur. Even though the communist party has lost much of its authority, the 
informal networks it established remain powerful. Moreover, Aidis and Adachi (2005) note 
that in Russia’s weak institutional environment, networks between enterprises and officials 
are paramount for business survival and growth. New businesses without such connections 
are in most cases destined to fail. 
Surprisingly little work has been done on the influence of networks for business entry 
in the Russian context. Given the existing context of weak institutions, poor regulatory 
enforcement, high levels of corruption and the lack of rule of law, the role of networks would 
seem of even greater importance at the start-up phase for business development. The existing 
literature (from advanced western countries) highlights the importance of networks especially 
weak ties for opportunity recognition and for obtaining access to resources needed to start-up 
a business. Furthermore, existing studies show that though strong ties constitute a base of 
trust that can provide comfort in the face of uncertainty (Krackhardt (1992), strong ties 
cannot be a bridge to new and dissimilar information as weak ties can provide (Granovetter 
1975)
19.  
The above discussion as well as our empirical results indicates the need for 
developing a new direction for research in contexts such as Russia where the institutional 
environment is weak and poorly enforced. Specifically our results indicating the low levels of 
business entry combined with the current research findings suggesting that Russian networks 
are over reliant on strong ties seems to point to the critical importance of weak ties for 
business formation. Further research is needed to explore the relationship of weak ties and 
business formation in weak institutional environments.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
Our results suggest that the negative environment for business, and especially 
entrepreneurial activity, in Russia has led to low levels of entrepreneurship. However, 
drawing on a sample that allows us to compare the characteristics of entrepreneurs in Russia 
with those of the rest of the population, we find that the relatively few brave souls who 
undertake some form of entrepreneurial activity in Russia are not so different in many ways 
from their counterparts in more business friendly environments. They are disproportionately 
young and male though not necessarily university educated. University education as a form of 
human capital was not found to be significantly associated with new start-ups yet 
entrepreneurship experience as well as white-collar occupational experience was significantly 
associated with new start-ups. This effect may be more important in the transition context 
such as Russia than in advanced western countries since ‘entrepreneurial’ skills were never 
taught (directly or indirectly) in the centrally planned system.  Our results seem to indicate 
that ‘learning by doing’ has proved to be an important form of human capital in the transition 
context of Russia.  
                                                 
19 As Puffer and McCarthy have noted, ‘commitment and trust among network members in Eastern European 
business networks are typically low, the ties extremely weak, the network knowledge poor and participants few’ 
(2001: 32).  
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Another important issue is financial constraints. Financial constraints prove to be 
important in explaining entrepreneurship, in the sense that entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
self-financed and to come from better paid households. However it should be noted that even 
in these cases, income levels are quite low and given the lack of external funding possibilities 
may lead to higher levels of business exit due simply to problems related to 
undercapitalization. Those that manage to create new firms are also personally more 
optimistic, which perhaps helps them through the adverse conditions facing those who aspire 
to be entrepreneurs.  
Though not tested directly, the lack of effective and extensive networks seem to play 
a further role in inhibiting entrepreneurship development in Russia. Through proxies such as 
sources of financing, household income and entrepreneurial experiences, our results indicate 
that Russian entrepreneurs make use of their networks as informal funding sources in an 
environment with limited formal funding possibilities. However given the inherited tradition 
of ‘blat’ probably implies that most Russians have a smaller circle of networks, even informal 
external funding remains limited. Therefore it would seem that only individuals with more 
direct access to higher levels of financial resources such as measured by household income 
could effectively engage in entrepreneurial activity. Finally, the high proportion of business 
owners engaged in start-up activities further provides evidence to the argument that those 
with access to an established network such as an existing business owner would be more 
inclined to start another business than individuals who do not have this resource to draw on. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by further exploring the influence of 
weak institutions and weak network structures on entrepreneurial development. Our results 
indicate that in the case of Russia, this combination is especially detrimental for 
entrepreneurial start-ups and development. Further research in this area is needed to pin down 
more carefully the relationship between institutional development and levels of 
entrepreneurial activity and how additional factors such as the presence and strength of 
informal networks may act as substitutes for dysfunctional institutions. Additional empirical 
work in transition countries and emerging economies on the effects of different levels of 
institutional development and types of network relations specifically focused on business 
entry using a comparative approach could also provide further insights into this important 
relationship.  
  21
References 
 
 
Ahuja, G. 2000. Collaboration networks, structural holes and innovation: A longitudinal study. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 45, 425 – 455. 
Aidis, R. 2003. Entrepreneurship and Economic Transition. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute 
discussion paper (http://www.tinbergen.nl). 
Aidis, R. and Y. Adachi. 2005. Firm Entry and Exit Barriers in Russia. Working Paper, SSEES/UCL, 
London. 
Aidis, R. and A. Sauka. 2005. Assessing moving targets: Analyzing the impact of transition stages on  
entrepreneurship development., Ekonomika 69: 1 – 23. 
Aidis, R. 2005. Entrepreneurship in Transition Countries: A Review. Centre for the Study of 
Economic and Social Change in Europe (CSECSE) working paper Number 61 
(http://www.ssees.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp61.pdf). 
Aldrich, H., B. Rosen and W. Woodward. 1987. The impact of social networks on business founding 
and profit. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson College. 
Ardichvili, A. and A. Gaparishvili. 2003. Russian and Georgian entrepreneurs and non- entrepreneurs: 
A study of value differences. Organization Studies 24: 29-46.            
Ardichvili, A., R. Cardozo and S. Ray. 2003. A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification 
and development. Journal of Business Venturing 18(1): 105 – 123. 
Barberis, N., M. Boycko,  A. Shleifer,  and  N. Tsukanova. 1996. How does privatization work? 
Evidence from the Russian shops. Journal of Political Economy 104(4): 764-791. 
Batjargal, B. 2003. Social capital and entrepreneurial performance in Russia: A longitudinal study. 
Organization Studies 24(4): 5353-556. 
Baumol, W. 1990. Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive. The Journal of 
Political Economy 98(5): 893 – 921. 
Baumol, W. 1993. Entrepreneurship, Management and the Structure of Payoffs. London: The MIT 
Press. 
Baumol, W. 2005. The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of 
Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Blanchflower, D. 2004. Self-employment: More may not be better. Working paper 10286. National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge, MA. 
Burt, R. 1992. Structural Holes: The Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Coleman, J.S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology 
94, S95 – S121. 
Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Davidsson, P. and B. Honig. 2003. The role of social capital and human capital among nascent 
entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 18(3): 301 – 331. 
De Wit, G. and F.A.A.M van Winden. 1998. An Empirical Analysis of Self-Employment in the 
Netherlands. Small Business Economics 1(4): 263-272. 
Delmar, F. and P. Davidsson. 2000. Where do they come from? Prevalence and characteristics of 
nascent entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 12: 1 - 23.  
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. The Regulation of Entry. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 67:1 - 37. 
Djankov, S., E. Miguel,  Y. Qian,  G. Roland and E.. Zhuravskaya. 2004. Who are Russia’s 
Entrepreneurs. Mimeo, World Bank.  
Djankov, S., E. Miguel, Y. Qian, G. Roland and E. Zhuravskaya. 2005. Who are the Russian 
Entrepreneurs? Journal of European Economic Association. Papers and Proceedings, Spring 2005. 
Djankov, S, Y. Qian, G. Roland and E. Zhuravskaya. 2006. Entrepreneurship and Development: First 
Results for China and Russia. Paper presented at the American Economic Association Conference, 
Boston, MA. (http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0108_1015_0204.pdf) 
Ellman, M. 1994.  Socialist Planning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Estrin, S., K. Meyer  and M.  Bytchova.  2006. Entrepreneurship in Transition . Economies. In M. 
Casson (ed.),Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.  
  22
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2002. Transition Report. London.  
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2005. Transition Report. London.  
Evans, D. and B. Jovanovic. 1989. An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity 
constraints. Journal of Political Economy 97(4): 808 – 827. 
Frye, T. and A. Shleifer. 1997. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand. American Economic 
Review 87:354-358. 
GEM. 2003. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Executive Report, (http://www.gemconsortium.org). 
GEM. 2005. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Executive Report, (http://www.gemconsortium.org). 
Glasser, S. 2004. A Reluctant Capitalist Survives in Russia. Washington Post, December 21.  
Granovetter, M. 1975. The strength of weak ties: Network theory revisited. American Journal of 
Sociology 78(6): 1369 – 1380. 
Granovetter, M. 1993. Getting a Job: A study of contacts and careers. 2
nd edition, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Grilo, I. and J. Irigoyen. 2006. Entrepreneurship in the EU: to wish and not to be. Small Business 
Economics, forthcoming. 
Grilo, I. and R. Thurik. 2005. Latent and actual entrepreneurship in Europe and the US. International 
Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 1(4): 441 – 459. 
Hills, G.E., G.T. Lumpkin, and R.P. Singh. 1997. Opportunity Recognition: Perceptions and 
Behaviours of Entrepreneurs. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson 
College. 
Hsu, C. 2005. Capitalism without contracts versus capitalists without capitalism: Comparing the 
influence of Chinese guanxi and Russian blat on marketization. Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 38: 309 – 327. 
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann and A. Schleifer. 1997. Politics and Entrepreneurship in Transition 
Economies. William Davidson Institute working paper no. 57. 
Johnson, S., J. McMillan and C. Woodruff. 1999. Contract enforcement in transition. EBRD   
Working paper no. 45 (http://www.ebrd.org). 
Johanisson, B. 2000. Networking and entrepreneurial growth. In D.L. Sexton and H. Lawrence (eds.) 
The Blackwell Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Blackwell: Oxford, 368 – 386. 
Johnson, S., J. McMillan and C. Woodruff. 2000. Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional 
reform. Economics of Transition 8(1): 1 – 36. 
Kaganova, O. 2002. Small businesses face large obstacles. Transition. The World Bank 44 -  45. 
Kets de Vries, M. and E. Florent –Treacy. 2003. Roustam Tariko (A): Russian Entrepreneur.  
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 300 – 313. 
Klapper, L., V. Saria-Allende, and V. Sulla. 2002. Small- and Medium-Size Enterprise Financing in 
Eastern Europe. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2933. December 2002, 
(http://www.worldbank.org). 
Klapper, L., Laeven, L. and R. Rajan . 2004. Barriers to Entrepreneurship. Mimeo. The World Bank. 
Krackhardt, D. 1992. The strength of strong ties: The importance of philos in organisations. In N. 
Nohria and R. Eccles (eds.) Networks and Organisations: Structure, Form and Action. Boston MA: 
Harvard University Press, 216 – 239. 
Ledeneva, A. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff. 1999. Interfirm relationships and informal credit in Vietnam.   
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4): 1285-1320. 
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff. 2002. The central role of entrepreneurs in transition economies. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3): 153-170. 
Minniti, M., P. Arenius and N. Langowitz. 2005. GEM 2004 Report on Women and Entrepreneurship 
(http://www.gemconsortium.org ). 
Nicholson, M. 1999. Towards a Russia of the Regions, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2005. Regulatory Reform in 
Russia: Government Capacity to assure High Quality Regulation (http://www.oecd.org). 
OPORA. 2005. Conditions and Factors Affecting the Development of Small Entrepreneurship in the 
Regions of the Russian Federation, report (http://www.opora.ru). 
Pissarides, F. 1999. Is lack of funds the main obstacle for Growth? EBRD's experience with small and 
medium-sized businesses in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Business Venturing 14:520-39.  
  23
Pissarides, F., M. Singer and J. Svejnar. 2003. Objectives and constraints of entrepreneurs: Evidence 
from small and medium-sized enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria. Journal of Comparative Economics 
31: 503 – 531.  
Pissarides, F. 2004. Financial Structures and private sector development in the new Europe. In D. 
Masciandoro (ed.), Financial Intermediation in the New Europe: Banks, Markets and Regulation in 
the Accession Countries. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Radaev, V. 2002. Entrepreneurship strategies and the structure of transaction costs in Russian    
business. In V. Bonnell and T. Gold (eds.) The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia, Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 191 – 213. 
Radaev, V. 2003. The Development of Small Entrepreneurship in Russia. In R. McIntyre and B. 
Dallago (eds.) Small and Medium Enterprises in Transitional Economies. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
114 - 133. 
Reynolds, P., M. Hay and S.M. Camp. 1999. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 1999 Executive 
Report (http://www.gemconsortium.org). 
Reynolds, P., W. Bygrave, E. Autio, L. Cox and M. Hay. 2002. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 
2002 Executive Report  (http://www.gemconsortium.org). 
Roberts K. and C. Zhou. 2000. New Private Enterprises in Three Transitional Contexts: Central  
Europe, the Former Soviet Union and China. Post-Communist Economies 12:186 - 199. 
Singh, R., G. Hills, R. Hybels and G. Lumpkin. 1999. Opportunity recognition through social network 
characteristics of entrepreneurs. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson 
College. 
Shleifer, A. and  R.W. Vishny. 1999. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Smolchenko, A. 2005. Small Businesses Slam Moscow. The Moscow Times, April 21, 2005, 1 – 2. 
Smallbone, D. and F. Welter. 2001. The Distinctiveness of Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies. 
Small Business Economics 16:249-62. 
Stark, D. 1996. Recombinant property in East European capitalism. American Journal of Sociology 
101 (4): 993 - 1027.  
Storey, D. 1994. Understanding the Small Business Sector. London: Routledge. 
Szelenyi, I. 1988. Socialist Entrepreneurs. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Transparency International. 2005. Corruption Perceptions Index ( http://www.transparency.org). 
Uhlaner, L. and R. Thurik. 2005. Post-Materialism: A cultural factor influencing total entrepreneurial 
activity across nations. Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy no 20 – 2005. Max 
Planck Institute of Economics, Jena Germany. 
Verheul, I., A. van Stel and R. Thurik. 2006. Explaining female and male entrepreneurship across 29 
countries. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, forthcoming. 
Walker, G., B. Kogut and W. Shan. 1997. Social capital, structural holes and the formation of an 
industry network. Organisational Science 8, 109 – 125. 
Webster. L. 1992. Private Sector Manufacturing in Hungary: A survey of firms. Industry Division, 
Industry and Energy Department, The World Bank.  
World Bank. 2005. World Bank 2005 Development Indicators. Washington DC. 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  8/15/06 
 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 833:  Institutions, Networks and Entrepreneurship Development in 
Russia: An Exploration 
Ruta Aidis and Saul Estrin  June 2006 
No. 832:  Long & Short Run Linkages in CEE Stock Markets: 
Implications for Portfolio Diversification & Stock Market Integration 
Manolis Syllignakis and Georgios 
Kouretas 
July 2006 
No. 831: Inequality, Fiscal Capacity and the Political Regime 
Lessons from the Post-Communist Transition 
Christopher J. Gerry and Tomasz 
Mickiewicz 
July 2006 
No. 830: Business Groups in Emerging Markets - 
Financial Control and Sequential Investment 
Christa Hainz  June 2006 
No. 829: Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets: Evidence 
from Post-Communist Russia 
Alexei Karas, William Pyle and 
Koen Schoors 
June 2006 
No. 828: Financial Deregulation and Financial Development, and 
Subsequent Impact on Economic Growth in the CzechRepublic, Hungary 
and Poland 
Patricia McGrath  June 2006 
No. 827: The Determinants & Excessiveness of Current AccountDeficits 
in Eastern Europe & the Former Soviet Union 
Aleksander Aristovnik  June 2006 
No. 826: Privatization with Government Control: Evidence from the 
Russian Oil Sector 
Daniel Berkowitz and Yadviga 
Semikolenova 
 
February 
2006 
No. 825: Corruption & Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy  John Bennett and Saul Estrin  February 
2006 
No. 824: Regulatory Barriers & Entry in Developing Economies  John Bennett and Saul Estrin  March 
2006 
No. 823:  Enterprise Restructuring in Belarus  Marina Bakanova, Saul Estrin, 
Igor Pelipas and Sergei Pukovic 
May 2006 
No. 822:  Reforms, Entry and Productivity:  Some Evidence from the 
Indian Manufacturing Sector 
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, 
Shubhashis Gangopadhyay and 
Shagun Krishnan 
March 
2006 
No. 821:  Falling Walls and Lifting Curtains: Analysis of Border Effects 
in Transition Countries 
Yener Kandogan  March 
2006 
No. 820: Home versus Host Country Effects of FDI: Searching for New 
Evidence of Productivity Spillovers 
Priit Vahter and Jaan Masso  March 
2006 
No. 819:  Earnings Inequality in India: Has the Rise of Caste and 
Religion Based Politics in India had an Impact? 
Kumar S. Bhaumik and Manisha 
Chakrabarty 
March 
2006 
No. 818: Financial Deregulation and Industrial Development: 
Subsequent Impacton Economic Growth in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland 
Patricia McGrath  February 
2006 
No. 817: The Politics of Institutional Renovation & Economic 
Upgrading: Lessons from the Argentine Wine Industry 
Gerald Mc Dermott  Dec 2005 
No. 816: Worker Morale in Russia: An Exploratory Study  Susan Linz, Linda Good & 
Patricia Huddleston 
January 
2006 
No. 815: Capital Account Liberalization and Exchange Rate Regime 
Choice, What Scope for Flexibility in Tunisia? 
BEN ALI Mohamed Sami 
 
March 
2006 
No. 814: Evaluation of Mass Privatization in Bulgaria  Jeffrey Miller  March 
2006 
No. 813: Current Account Adjustments in Selected Transition Countries  Aleksander Aristovnik  Feb. 2006 
No. 812:  Reassessing the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union: An 
Analysis Using Archival and Anthropometric Data 
Elizabeth Brainerd  Jan. 2006 
No. 811: Foreign Exchange Risk Premium Determinants: Case of 
Armenia 
Tigran Poghoysan and Evzen 
Kocenda 
March 
2006 
No. 810: Convergence and shocks in the road to EU: Empirical 
investigations for Bulgaria and Romania 
Jean-Marc Figuet and Nikolay 
Nenovsky 
March 
2006 
 